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POINT ONE 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY 
TO UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
A. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are Bound by 
Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals are 
bound by prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. The 
fact that this Court is uncomfortable with such a decision 
does not give it the discretion to evade the effect of 
the higher court's decision. See e.g., Van Tassell v. 
Shaffer, 64 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 73 (Sept. 1, 1987), where the Court 
of Appeals deferred to a rule on "tolling" which it clearly 
found wanting. Accord, State v. Gore, 681 P. 2d 227 (Wash. 
1984). 
B. The Utah Supreme Court has Clearly Held that Evidence 
of Flight is Admissible 
The court of appeals' opinion states that Trapp's 
flight had "little, if any, relevance" (p. 5). However, the 
Utah Supreme Court has flatly declared: "We have previously 
ruled that evidence of flight is probative." State v. 
Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 39 (Utah 1987). State v. Bales, 675 
P.2d 573 (Utah 1983), likewise affirmed "the admissibility 
of evidence of flight. . ." Bales merely dealt with the 
kind of instruction which should accompany admissions. 
The "overwhelming" prejudice from admission of 
flight, as claimed in this Court's opinion is not mentioned 
by either case. Indeed, there appears to be a de facto rule 
that evidence of flight is always admitted in criminal 
cases. A survey of criminal cases nationwide since 1981 
shows over 200 cases where flight was admitted. Not one was 
reversed for unfair prejudice to the defendant. (See West 
2 
Digest Criminal Law, Key No, 351(3).) Indeed, trial courts 
in criminal cases have abused their discretion in excluding 
flight. U.S. v. Martinez, 681 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1982) 
(abuse to exclude under Rule 403). 
Furthermore, this Court will undoubtedly continue 
to affirm criminal convictions based in part on evidence of 
flight. The rule in Franklin and Bales admitting flight 
evidence is the law in Utah. 
C. State v. Franklin Applies in Civil Cases 
This court's opinion relegates Franklin and its 
progenitors to a footnote, and distinguishes them because 
they arose "in the criminal context" (p. 3). This reasoning 
fundamentally misunderstands the scope of the rules of 
evidence and precedents interpreting them. Utah Rule of 
Evidence, 101, states "These rules govern proceedings in the 
courts of this state. •" No exception is made for 
criminal cases. 
The Advisory Committee note indicates that the 
Rules of Evidence are "applicable in all instances in 
court's of the State." Furthermore, former Rule 2 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence expressly applied the rules of 
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evidence to both criminal and civil cases. There is no 
authority, and no reason, for the view that evidence which 
is admissible in criminal cases is inadmissible in civil 
cases. 
Precedents interpreting the Rules of Evidence are 
applicable in both criminal and/or civil cases. Otherwise, 
two separate bodies of case law would develop out of 
identical rules. 
This court's opinion goes on to assert that flight 
evidence is "circumspectly" admitted. Presumably, this 
means admitted with an appropriate cautionary instruction.* 
Fisher has no particular quarrel with the need for an 
appropriate instruction. Thus, the only consistent rule 
would be that evidence of flight should be "circumspectly" 
admitted in civil cases also, with an appropriate cautionary 
instruction. 
D. Criminal Negligence Cases Always Admit Evidence of 
Flight 
The claimed distinction between admission of 
flight evidence in "a civil action for negligence" and "in 
1 "Circumspectly" may be intended to mean "seldom." 
This would probably come as a complete surprise to criminal 
defense lawyers in Utah. 
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the criminal context" completely collapses in those cases 
where negligence and criminal conduct overlap. Criminal 
negligence cases involving driving an automobile uniformly 
admit evidence of post-accident flight. 
In State v. Pierce, 647 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1982) , a 
hit-and-run drunk driver was convicted of aggravated assault 
and criminal negligence. The Montana Supreme Court stated 
"Flight by the defendant may be considered by the jury as a 
circumstance tending to prove consciousness of guilt." Id. 
at 851. Admissibility of flight was upheld even though the 
defendant admitted causing the accident and even though 
there were ample witnesses. 
Evidence of post-accident flight was also admitted 
in the following cases: Clay v. State, 128 A.2d 634 (Md. 
1957)(prosecution for manslaughter based on gross 
negligence; defendant admitted he caused the accident); 
State v. Humbolt, 562 P.2d 123 (Kan. App. 1977)(involuntary 
manslaughter conviction; admissible to show "consciousness 
of guilt"); People v. Allen, 14 N.E.2d 397 (111. 
1938)(manslaughter based on willful and wanton negligence; 
defendant admitted to accident); State v. Achter, 445 S.W,2d 
318 (Mo. 1969)(evidence of post-accident flight considered 
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on issue of culpable negligence)• Presumably, the same 
dangers in admitting flight evidence exist in these criminal 
cases as in civil cases. 
POINT TWO 
REHEARING IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
THE COURT HAS CREATED AN ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR RULE 
This Court's opinion would allow evidence of 
flight if Trapp were being prosecuted for drunk driving, but 
not when his innocent victim sues him. This rule is doubly 
unfair—unfair to criminals doing time on the basis of 
"overwhelmingly" prejudicial evidence of flightf and unfair 
to their victims who cannot recover from them. 
The reality is that the same facts that support 
criminal liability also gives rise to civil liability. Why 
should balancing under Rule 403 of the same facts result in 
admission in the criminal case, but not in the civil case? 
This Court found prejudice in the danger that the 
jury will not believe other reasons the defendant has for 
fleeing (p. 5). This same danger exists in every criminal 
case (including Franklin and Bales). Why is the danger that 
the jury will discount the defendant's explanation so 
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compelling in a civil case, yet not compelling in a criminal 
case? The rule laid down in this Court's opinion is 
arbitrary and unfair. Rehearing should be granted. 
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